The subject matter of the article is the concept of “the real use of reason” alluded to by Kant in Critique of Pure Reason A299/b355 and in A305/b362. After comparing it with the “real use of understanding” examined in De mundi sensibilis and in the Critique of Pure Reason, the real use of reason is presented as a legitimate and useful performance that should be distinguished from the deceiving illusion induced by an appearance generated by reason itself. The real use (...) of reason proves itself as an unavoidable condition for the regulative use of ideas as well as a condition for the production of a critical metaphysics. (shrink)

German words ending in ›-nis‹ can have either the female or the neutral gender. As is well known, in his Cri-tique of Pure Reason as well as in other writings, Kant often shifts from the neuter to the feminine for words having the mentioned ending, without thereby leading to a difference in meaning. However, in German the word »know-ledge« does not only have an epistemological meaning, but a legal sense as well. It has the meaning of »arbitration award, a judge (...) ́s deci-sion, verdict«. In the present article I try to prove that Kant occassionally uses the word »knowledge« in the legal sense rather than in the epistemological sense. (shrink)

pt. I. Matter: 1. Philosophy as worldview ; 2. Classical matter: bodies and fields ; 3. Quantum matter: weird but real ; 4. General concept of matter: to be is to become ; 5. Emergence and levels ; 6. Naturalism ; 7. Materialism -- pt. II. Mind: 8. The mind-body problem ; 9. Minding matter: the plastic brain ; 10. Mind and society ; 11. Cognition, consciousness, and free will ; 12. Brain and computer: the hardware/software dualism ; 13. Knowledge: (...) genuine and bogus -- pt. III. Appendices: 14. Appendix A: Objects ; 15. Appendix B. Truths. (shrink)

I critically examine one central line of reasoning in Mario Caimi's book »Kant's B Deduction« (Cambridge Publishing, 2014).

A country must develop skills for managing the financial resources that are needed to support scientific and technological activities. With proper financial support and policy guidance, these activities can increase the stock of accumulated human resources and means that contribute to income and the satisfaction of needs.

We put forth an account for when to believe causal and evidential conditionals. The basic idea is to embed a causal model in an agent’s belief state. For the evaluation of conditionals seems to be relative to beliefs about both particular facts and causal relations. Unlike other attempts using causal models, we show that ours can account rather well not only for various causal but also evidential conditionals.

Predictivists use the no miracle argument to argue that “novel” predictions are decisive evidence for theories, while mere accommodation of “old” data cannot confirm to a significant degree. But deductivists claim that since confirmation is a logical theory-data relationship, predicted data cannot confirm more than merely deduced data, and cite historical cases in which known data confirmed theories quite strongly. On the other hand, the advantage of prediction over accommodation is needed by scientific realists to resist Laudan’s criticisms of the (...) no miracle argument. So, if the deductivists are right, the most powerful argument for realism collapses. There seems to be an inescapable contradiction between these prima facie plausible arguments of predictivists and deductivists; but this puzzle can be solved by understanding what exactly counts as novelty, if novel predictions must support the no miracle argument, i.e., if they must be explainable only by the truth of theories. Taking my cues from the use-novelty tradition, I argue that (1) the predicted data must not be used essentially in building the theory or choosing the auxiliary assumptions. This is possible if the theory and its auxiliary assumptions are plausible independently of the predicted data, and I analyze the consequences of this requirement in terms of best explanation of diverse bodies of data. Moreover, the predicted data must be (2) a priori improbable, and (3) heterogeneous to the essentially used data. My proposed notion of novelty, therefore, is not historical, but functional. Hence, deductivists are right that confirmation is independent of time and of historical contingencies such as if the theorist knew a datum, used it, or intended to accommodate it. Predictivists, however, are right that not all consequences confirm equally, and confirmation is not purely a logical theory-data relation, as it crucially involves background epistemic conditions and the notion of best explanation. Conditions (1)–(3) make the difference between prediction and accommodation, and account for the confirming power of theoretical virtues such as non ad-hocness, non-fudging, non-overfitting, independence and consilience. I thus show that functional novelty (a) avoids the deductivist objections to predictivism, (b) is a gradual notion, in accordance with the common intuition that confirmation comes in degrees, and (c) supports the no miracle argument, so vindicating scientific realism. (shrink)

It is generally argued that if the wave-function in the de Broglie–Bohm theory is a physical field, it must be a field in configuration space. Nevertheless, it is possible to interpret the wave-function as a multi-field in three-dimensional space. This approach hasn’t received the attention yet it really deserves. The aim of this paper is threefold: first, we show that the wave-function is naturally and straightforwardly construed as a multi-field; second, we show why this interpretation is superior to other interpretations (...) discussed in the literature; third, we clarify common misconceptions. (shrink)

Nowadays, the concepts of soldier and war have changed due to terrorism and the war on terrorism. According to the literature, to prevent terrorism, it is possible to use more violence, but how can we grant the safety of many versus the dignity of a few? In Israel, in order to protect civilians against possible terrorist attacks, Palestinian ambulances that would reach the Israeli hospitals (or the Palestinian hospitals in East Jerusalem) must be quickly controlled. However, many times, at the (...) checkpoint, patients have to wait for an Israeli vehicle that will take them to Israel. This procedure causes many delays in medical emergency. How to avoid that terrorists may receive better care than Palestinian civilians may just because they are already on the Israeli side of the Separation Wall? How is it possible to ensure the life and safety of many, without denying the right to healthcare to somebody? How to decide when the State requirements conflict with traditional medical duties? Is it acceptable to provide health care to a terrorist? What should be done when it is uncertain whether the ambulance transports weapons besides patients? These questions call upon the core role of the doctor and of the medical profession: taking care of all sick persons. The care is the starting point of ethics. If we do not care about other human beings we do not have a real moral comprehension of any human ideal or action. For this reason we can say that the care is the premise of morality. The rights of all citizens, including the claim to public security, grounds on the care for each individual who needs help. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to elucidate the notions of explanation and mechanism, in particular of the social kind. A mechanism is defined as what makes a concrete system tick, and it is argued that to propose an explanation proper is to exhibit a lawful mechanism. The so-called covering law model is shown to exhibit only the logical aspect of explanation: it just subsumes particulars under universals. A full or mechanismic explanation involves mechanismic law statements, not purely descriptive ones (...) such as functional relations and rate equations. Many examples from the natural, biosocial, and social sciences are examined. In particular, macro-micro-micro-macro social relations are shown to explain other wise puzzling macro-macro links. The last part of the article relates the author's progress, over half a century, toward understanding mechanism and explanation. (shrink)

Biomedical research, on the one hand, contributes to important goals from generation of knowledge about the human body to the development and testing of therapeutics of all kinds. On the other hand, it can produce serious and sometimes unforeseeable consequences. In the ethical analysis of these two aspects of biomedical research, two important argumentative strategies play a major role. First, slippery slope arguments are used to warn of potential risks and to highlight knowledge-based limitations. Second, a dual-use problem describes the (...) challenge that already established techniques can be used for both morally wrong and morally right purposes. These two argumentative strategies appear to share several similarities, which will be investigated in this article. For this purpose, the article will first provide clear working definitions for both types of argument. This lays the foundation for the further ethical analysis. In a second step, and in order to investigate the similarities and differences of the argumentative strategies with an example from current ethical debates, CRISPR-Cas9, a currently very promising tool of genome editing, will be examined. The extent to which the possible applications of this genome editing tool can be addressed by slippery slope arguments or the dual use problem will be investigated. For this purpose, selected studies involving the use of CRISPR-Cas9 will be examined. Based on this two-step, analytic and example-based comparison of slippery-slope argumentation and dual-use considerations, the article will detail the ethically relevant difference between the two argumentative strategies and at the same time contribute to the ongoing ethical debate about CRISPR-Cas9. (shrink)

We determined the prevailing ethical climate at three different schools of a single university, in order to explore possible differences in the ethical climate related to different research fields: the School of Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, and Naval Architecture; the School of Humanities and Social Sciences; and the School of Medicine. We used the Ethical Climate Questionnaire to survey the staff at the three schools, and used the research integrity and organizational climate survey for early-stage researchers at the three schools. (...) The dominant ethical climate type perceived collectively at the three university schools was Laws and professional codes, which is associated with the cosmopolitan level of analysis and the ethical construct of principle. Individually, the same climate predominated at the schools for engineering and humanities, but the School of Medicine had the Self-interest ethical climate, which is associated with the individual level of analysis and the egoism ethical construct. In the RIOC survey, early-stage researchers from the three university schools did not differ in their perceptions of the organizational research integrity climate, or in their perceived individual, group or organizational pressures. Our study is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to show differences in perceived ethical climate at a medical school compared to other schools at a university. Further studies are needed to explore the reasons for these differences and how they translate to organizational outcomes, such as job satisfaction, commitment to the institution and dysfunctional behaviour, including research misconduct. (shrink)

One issue underlying all others when technology transfer occurs is the need to build capacity. This capacity is needed in order to know what to buy, when to buy, from whom to buy, and how to buy. These decisions should always be taken by those working within a country's economy, particularly the decision on what to buy, which is value laden.

The initial relationships between organisms leading to endosymbiosis and the first eukaryote are currently a topic of hot debate. Here, I present a theory that offers a gradual scenario in which the origins of phagocytosis and mitochondria are intertwined in such a way that the evolution of one would not be possible without the other. In this scenario, the premitochondrial bacterial symbiont became initially associated with a protophagocytic host on the basis of cooperation to kill prey with symbiont‐produced toxins and (...) reactive oxygen species (ROS). Subsequently, the cooperation was focused on the digestion stage, through the acidification of the protophagocytic cavities via exportation of protons produced by the aerobic respiration of the symbiont. The host gained an improved phagocytic capacity and the symbiont received organic compounds from prey. As the host gradually lost its membrane energetics to develop lysosomal digestion, respiration was centralized in the premitochondrial symbiont for energy production for the consortium. (shrink)

Terms such as 'despotism' and 'tyranny' which proved efficacious in clarifying political debate until the beginning of the 19th century, have been eliminated from the vocabulary of political science because of a confusion that has muddled their sense. This vocabulary has thus become impoverished to the advantage of terms like 'autocracy', or yet others, especially 'dictatorship', equally vague and imprecise. This article demonstrates (through the adventures of the term 'despotism' during 23 centuries) that we have forgotten a distinction between these (...) two 'conceptual terms' which was clear in the past, and it attempts to understand at which moment in history the confusion occurred and why. There is no question of restoring the distinction in contemporary political vocabulary. This work would simply like to encourage people to reflect on the political terminology inherited from tradition, on the correct use of concepts and of their definitions, in order to reintegrate political vocabulary and render it more useful in decrypting contemporary reality, which remains often complex and even undecipherable. (shrink)

Many formulations of scientific realism (SR) include some commitment to metaphysical realism (MR). On the other hand, authors like Schlick, Carnap and Putnam held forms of scientific realism coupled with metaphysical antirealism (and this has analogies in Kant). So we might ask: do scientific realists really need MR? or is MR already implied by SR, so that SR is actually incompatible with metaphysical antirealism? And if MR must really be added to SR, why is that so? And which additional arguments (...) scientific realists need to support it? After reviewing and classifying a number of different kinds of realisms, metaphysical and not, I answer that SR and MR are logically independent of each other, so that there is no logical inconsistency in holding SR while rejecting MR. However, I argue that the “no miracle” argument (NMA) not only is the “ultimate” argument for SR, but by the same token it also supports MR. Therefore one cannot effectively defend SR without also subscribing to MR, but this can be done at no additional argumentative cost. I show this by discussing not only the standard version of the NMA, but also three more versions which are not usually considered as such in the literature. (shrink)

This essay, between serious and facetious, addresses an apparently secondary implication of the planetary tragedy produced by Covid-19. It coincides with the ‘problem of the veil,’ a bone of contention in Islam/West relationships. More specifically, it will address the question of why the pandemic has changed the proxemics of public spaces and the grammar of ‘living together.’ For some time—and it is not possible to foresee how much—in many countries people cannot go out, or enter any public places, without wearing (...) a sanitary mask. In short, almost all of us, by obligation or by urgent advice from the public authorities of the various countries, will not live the public sphere with our faces uncovered. The alteration of the social context affecting many Western countries will inevitably involve also the ‘local’ perception of the Islamic veil and—as a matter of equality—the consistency of the prohibition of wearing it. What will thus become of the ban on wearing it in public places established by some countries such as France and asseverated by the ECHR? If everyone can and will have to go around with their faces covered, why should only Islamic women be discriminated against? Will not the change in boundary conditions produced by Covid-19 also induce Western people to re-categorize the meaning of the veil? And will this re-categorization not directly affect the ‘fact’ of wearing the veil, that is, its empirical perception? And still, will this psycho-semantic change not show how empirical perceptions are cultural constructs rather than ‘objective facts,’ as such allegedly independent from the observer’s point of view? Consequentially, will the plurality of perceptions and cultural meanings related to the gesture of covering one’s own face not gain renewed relevance in determining the legitimacy of wearing the veil? The socio-semantic earthquake produced by Covid-19 compels us to rethink this and other issues orbiting around the translation of ‘facts’ into legal language; furthermore, it highlights the instrumentality of many ideological/partisan and ethnocentric assumptions passed off as objectivity regarding those alleged ‘facts.’ The essay will attempt to provide an answer to the above questions by proposing a semiotic-legal approach to intercultural conflicts and, indirectly, the pluralism in law. (shrink)

Hegel’s conception of a universal history of reason is usually interpreted as a Eurocentric project that is dismissive of the genuine contributions by other cultures. In contrast to this assumption, his views concerning Chinese philosophical traditions evolved significantly in his late Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Hegel increasingly acknowledges a unique contribution of Confucianism and especially Daoism. While Confucianism is depicted as a natural religion of magic in which the emperor governs as the supreme magician, Daoism revolts against the (...) emperor’s nepotism and turns to the Dao to elaborate a speculative philosophy of reason. The paper argues that the search for a rational form of mysticism is the basis for increasingly valuing the Chinese contributions to a conception of reason that incorporates mystical elements. (shrink)

This essay stages a dialectical confrontation between Adorno–Horkheimer on one hand and Benjamin–Badiou on the other against the background of the former's reductive portrait of Ulysses in Dialectic of the Enlightenment, which depicts him as a proto-bourgeois archetype of profit-seeking and acquisitive ethos. In sharp contrast, Walter Benjamin's allegorical materialism foregrounds, by dialectical illumination, hieroglyphic traces of Homeric virtues. These, I argue, are sustained and further amplified by Alain Badiou's topological ethics and loop-politics.

In the early 1250’s, Albert the Great wrote the De mineralibus to establish a mineralogical science based on Aristotelian epistemology. In the first instance, the Dominican master undertakes to clarify the proximal material and efficient causes of minerals. In his analysis, the examination of material causes proceeds through the evaluation of the Peripatetic and Arabic mineralogy, while the study of the efficient causes leads Albert to align the formative process of the mineral substances with the processes of the generation of (...) animals and plants. Here the physiological role of heat acting upon moisture is crucial in the context of matter acquiring form. In contrast with the mineralogical tradition, Albert assigns the role of the efficient cause of stones and metals to heat, thus laying the foundation for a general theory of the process of generation. With respect to every degree of being, heat, on the one hand, is the active quality of matter, being able to act upon the elements; on the other hand, it conveys all the natural formative principles required for the formation of a substance. (shrink)

In the early 1250’s, Albert the Great wrote the De mineralibus to establish a mineralogical science based on Aristotelian epistemology. In the first instance, the Dominican master undertakes to clarify the proximal material and efficient causes of minerals. In his analysis, the examination of material causes proceeds through the evaluation of the Peripatetic and Arabic mineralogy, while the study of the efficient causes leads Albert to align the formative process of the mineral substances with the processes of the generation of (...) animals and plants. Here the physiological role of heat acting upon moisture is crucial in the context of matter acquiring form. In contrast with the mineralogical tradition, Albert assigns the role of the efficient cause of stones and metals to heat, thus laying the foundation for a general theory of the process of generation. With respect to every degree of being, heat, on the one hand, is the active quality of matter, being able to act upon the elements; on the other hand, it conveys all the natural formative principles required for the formation of a substance. (shrink)

This book is about politics, political theory, and political philosophy. Although these disciplines are often conflated because they interact, they actually are distinct. Political theory is part of political science, whereas political philosophy is a hybrid of political theory and philosophy. The former discipline is descriptive and explanatory, whereas the latter is prescriptive--to the point that it is often called "normative theory." It is in fact the evaluative study of political societies. Whereas political theorists describe and explain politics, political philosophers (...) examine it critically and venture to suggest improvements and, on occasion, radically different social futures. Political philosophers propose scenarios and dreams where political scientists offer snapshots of existing polities. While these disciplines are distinct, Mario Bunge asserts that they must inform each other. Political philosophy is not yet a well-defined field: it hovers between political theory and utopian fantasizing. Few, if any earlier thinkers could have anticipated any of the most pressing political issues of our time, such as the need to stop global warming, reduce nuclear armaments, stop the rise of inequality between individuals and nations, and fight authoritarianism, particularly when it comes disguised as democracy or as socialism. Not even more recent social thinkers had much to say about such topical issues as environmental degradation, gender and race discriminations, participative democracy, nationalism, imperialism, the North-South divide, resource wars, the industrial-military complex, or the connections between poverty and environmental degradation, and between inequality and bad health. Beyond ideological divergences, most political philosophers have been nearly unanimous in their indifference to the plight of the Third World. Bunge does not share that indifference. He also believes that political philosophers should pay more attention to numbers, such as the standard index of income inequality and the more comprehensive United Nations human development index for the various nations. It is pointless to write about redistributive policies unless we have some of idea of current wealth distribution. This is, in short a modern treatise of inherited concerns. (shrink)

Some arguments against David Lewis’s modal realism seek to exploit apparent inconsistencies between it and anthropic reasoning. A recent argument, in particular, seeks to exploit an inconsistency between modal realism and typicality anthropic premises, premises common in the literature on physical multiverses, to the effect that observers who are like human observers in certain respects must be typical in the relevant multiverse. Here I argue that typicality premises are not applicable to the description of Lewis’s metaphysical multiverse, where the proportions (...) of metaphysically possible observers possessing the pertinent properties can be independently established by metaphysical reasoning. However, other kinds of reasonable anthropic premises can be seen to be consistent with and usable within modal realism. (shrink)

On the basis of the evidence that tumor development is suppressed by the embryonic microenvironment, some experiments using the factors taken from Zebrafish embryo at precise stages of cell differentiation were made. These experiments demonstrated a significant growth inhibition on different tumor cell lines in vitro. The observed mechanism of tumor growth inhibition is connected with the key-role cell cycle regulation molecules, such as p53 and pRb, which are modified by transcriptional or post-translational processes. Research on apoptosis and differentiation revealed (...) that treatment with these factors induces caspase-3 with a p73 apoptotic-dependent pathway activation and a concurrent significant normalization of e-cadherin and beta-catenin ratio. Other experiments found a synergistic effect on the colon cancer proliferation curve after the concurrent treatment with these factors and 5-fluorouracil. Finally, a product prepared for human therapy demonstrated 19.8% regression and 16% stable disease in an... (shrink)

Today’s pluralist and multicultural society raises questions about how to teach religiously and ethnically diverse students in Catholic schools. A Catholic Philosophy of Education addresses these challenges by examining the documents from the Roman Congregation for Catholic Education alongside the writings of Jacques Maritain and Bernard Lonergan. Mario D’Souza proposes a contemporary formulation for a Catholic philosophy of education in which the ideals of Catholicism form the basis for the mission of the Catholic school. Drawing on the Church’s educational (...) documents, and informed by Maritain and Lonergan, D’Souza explains how the unifying anthropology of Catholic education enables Catholic schools to serve amidst diversity by avoiding the extremes of religious exclusivism and fundamentalism, on the one hand, and relativism and individualism, on the other. He explores the aims of Catholic schools in relation to students, teachers, and society, and the relationship between goodness, discipline, and knowledge. He argues that students must be educated for personal and communal freedom and authenticity, and to strive for the common good, suggesting how a Catholic philosophy of education can provide the framework for such personal and communal transformation. Essential reading for new and experienced Catholic educators, A Catholic Philosophy of Education demonstrates that Maritain and Lonergan have much to offer in service of an education that is liberating, instructive, illuminating, and integrative. (shrink)

When adopting a sound logical system, reasonings made within this system are correct. The situation with reasonings expressed, at least in part, with natural language is much more ambiguous. One way to be certain of the correctness of these reasonings is to provide a logical model of them. To conclude that a reasoning process is correct we need the logical model to be faithful to the reasoning. In this case, the reasoning inherits, so to speak, the correctness of the logical (...) model. There is a weak link in this procedure, which we call the faithfulness problem: how do we decide that the logical model is faithful to the reasoning that it is supposed to model? That is an issue external to logic, and we do not have rigorous formal methods to make the decision. The purpose of this paper is to expose the faithfulness problem (not to solve it). For that purpose, we will consider two examples, one from the geometrical reasoning in Euclid’s Elements and the other from a study on deductive reasoning in the psychology of reasoning. (shrink)

What is or should be the place of the ethical dimension in a general enactive theory of sociality? How should such a dimension be understood and articulated within the more general picture of the enactive approach to social life? In this paper, building on Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy, we argue that ethics should be understood as a distinct dimension of the complex and multidimensional phenomenon of sociality; a dimension of radical otherness that intertwines with but does not reduce to the intersubjective (...) dynamics of social life. In showing the particular place that the ethical dimension occupies in the general picture of sociality, we show, following Levinas, why sociality is more than intersubjectivity and how enactivism, if interested in a comprehensive account of ethics, would benefit from this insight. (shrink)

One of the most difficult and interesting problems of rational decision is the choice among possible diverging paths in theory construction and among competing scientific theories—i.e., systems of accurate testable hypotheses. This task involves many beliefs—some warranted and others not as warranted—and marks decisive crossroads. Suffice to recall the current conflict between the general theory of relativity and alternative theories of gravitation that account for the same empirical evidence, the rivalry among different interpretations of quantum mechanics, and the variety of (...) cosmological theories. They all account for the same observed facts although they may predict different kinds of as yet unknown facts; they are consequently, up to now, empirically equivalent theories even though they are conceptually different and may even involve different philosophical views—i.e., they are conceptually inequivalent. (shrink)

"Most entries are brief and nontechnical in nature, highlighting useful philosophical terms rather than trendy ones. Placing his emphasis on living philosophy, Bunge deliberately excludes many of the archaic terms and philosophical curios of other dictionaries.

The received view in philosophical studies of quantum field theory is that Feynman diagrams are simply calculational devices. Alongside this view we have the one that takes virtual quanta to be also simply formal tools. This received view was developed and consolidated in philosophy of physics by Mario Bunge, Paul Teller, Michael Redhead, Robert Weingard, Brigitte Falkenburg, and others. In this article I present an alternative to the received view.

In this paper, we will make explicit the relationship that exists between geometric objects and geometric figures in planar Euclidean geometry. That will enable us to determine basic features regarding the role of geometric figures and diagrams when used in the context of pure and applied planar Euclidean geometry, arising due to this relationship. By taking into account pure geometry, as developed in Euclid’s Elements, and practical geometry, we will establish a relation between geometric objects and figures. Geometric objects are (...) defined in terms of idealizations of the corresponding figures of practical geometry. We name the relationship between them as a relation of idealization. This relation, existing between objects and figures, is what enables figures to have a role in pure and applied geometry. That is, we can use a figure or diagram as a representation of geometric objects or composite geometric objects because the relation of idealization corresponds to a resemblance-like relationship between objects and figures. Moving beyond pure geometry, we will defend that there are two other ‘layers’ of representation at play in applied geometry. To show that, we will consider Euclid’s Optics. (shrink)

Among the influential contributions of Alfred Tarski to logic and philosophy, and close in importance to his widely applied and discussed definition of truth, one finds his definition of logical consequence for formal languages. Like his definition of truth, Tarski's definition of logical consequence has been widely and fruitfully applied. Unlike the definition of truth, that of logical consequence has been rarely discussed philosophically. The main aim of this dissertation is to offer a thorough discussion of some philosophical issues arising (...) from the neglected definition. ;The point of departure is an interpretative reading of the relevant writings by Tarski. This reading yields historically interesting data that refute other recent readings. It also provides philosophical illumination, by clarifying how Tarski thought that his definition satisfied some pretheoretic desiderata. ;Next it is discussed whether Tarski's definition satisfies other pretheoretic desiderata, not stated by Tarski and in some cases not endorsed by him, but which are desiderata nonetheless from reasonable standpoints. These include the desiderata that all instances of logical consequence in Tarski's defined sense be instances of analytical implication, and that they be instances of valid implication. The conclusion of this part of the dissertation is that, under reasonable assumptions regarding the field of applicability of the definition and the concepts used in it, there are reasons to believe that these desiderata are met, and none to believe they are not. ;Finally, the problem of logical constants is examined. The concept of a "logical constant" is the only concept not taken from logic and mathematics that appears in Tarski's definition. The problem of logical constants is that of replacing the primitive 'logical constant' with a defined, better understood concept, and in a such a way that the resulting defined concept of logical consequence meets the previously discussed desiderata. The main conclusion of this part is that some attempts to do this replace the obscure with the more obscure, while other attempts that seem to be in the right spirit have shortcomings of their own. (shrink)

The aim of this research is to propose a framework to remedy potential dignity violations to families with children with disabilities seeking tourism experiences. We build on a systematic literature review on the topic of tourism of families with children with disabilities to propose a conceptual framework of dignity protection for this segment. This framework analyzes the responsibilities of four stakeholders (service providers, government, other tourists, and families) classified into dignity thresholds, to reduce attitudinal, information, and infrastructure barriers faced by (...) children with disabilities and their families when traveling. This paper is one of the few studies that connects the concept of dignity to the family tourism literature (with a special focus on a type of family variation neglected in terms of adequate tourism experiences) through a stakeholder approach focusing on the collaboration among actors within the industry to advance the creation of suitable tourism experiences for families with children with disabilities. (shrink)

Evolution creates structures of increasing order and power; in this process the stronger prevail over the weaker and carry the evolution further. Technology is an artificial creation that often threatens life and evolution conceived of as natural phenomena; but technology also supports life and it works together with evolution. However, there are claims that technology will do much more than that, and bring about an entirely new epoch of evolution. Technology will replace the fragile biological carriers of evolution by a (...) new kind of nonbiological carriers of immense intelligence and power. The present paper discusses the plausibility and weaknesses of such fascinating projections that some people proudly announce as the final liberation of the Mind, while others fear them as signs of the final self-annihilation of the Man. (shrink)

i propose a revisionist account of the production and reception of galileo's telescopic observations of 1609–10, an account that focuses on the relationship between credit and disclosure. galileo, i argue, acted as though the corroboration of his observations were easy, not difficult. his primary worry was not that some people might reject his claims, but rather that those able to replicate them could too easily proceed to make further discoveries on their own and deprive him of credit. consequently, he tried (...) to slow down potential replicators to prevent them from becoming competitors. he did so by not providing other practitioners access to high-power telescopes and by withholding information about how to build them. this essay looks at the development of galileo's monopoly on early telescopic astronomy to understand how the relationship between disclosure and credit changed as he moved from being an instrument-maker to becoming a discoverer and, eventually, a court philosopher. (shrink)

The ArgumentI propose a revisionist account of the production and reception of Galileo's telescopic observations of 1609–10, an account that focuses on the relationship between credit and disclosure. Galileo, I argue, acted as though the corroboration of his observations were easy, not difficult. His primary worry was not that some people might reject his claims, but rather that those able to replicate them could too easily proceed to make further discoveries on their own and deprive him of credit. Consequently, he (...) tried to slow down potential replicators to prevent them from becoming competitors. He did so by not providing other practitioners access to high-power telescopes and by withholding information about how to build them. This essay looks at the development of Galileo's monopoly on early telescopic astronomy to understand how the relationship between disclosure and credit changed as he moved from being an instrument-maker to becoming a discoverer and, eventually, a court philosopher. (shrink)

I offer a new objectivist theory of the contents of color language and color experience, intended especially as an account of what normal intersubjective variation in color perception and classification shows about those contents. First I explain an abstract account of the contents of color and other gradable adjectives; on the account, these contents are certain objective properties constituted in part by contextually intended standards of application, which are in turn values in the dimensions of variation associated with the adjectives. (...) Then I propose an explanation of normal variations in linguistic color classification; these are postulated to be effects of differences in intended standards for the color adjectives appearing in the classifying predicates. Next, I consider a potential objection to this explanation, based on the suggestion that contextual content should be more accessible than the explanation predicts. In reply, I point out that contextual content is occasionally opaque to unsophisticated reflection. Finally, I present a companion account of the contents of color experiences on which these represent an object as lying on certain salient intervals in the chromatic dimensions, and I show how the account accommodates intersubjective variation in color perception. (shrink)

During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, one of the most controversial intellectual disputes was the question of method in natural philosophy, or physics. The tensions between observational experience and geometrization, demonstration from the effects and from the causes, and between Aristotle’s authority and new philosophical tendencies made some philosophers search for new solutions. Others criticized these new solutions and tried to show the validity of several medieval scholastic readings of Aristotle. With this article, I intend to present the role of (...) experience in the dispute between Nicoletto Vernia’s approach to the subject-matter of physics and Gomes of Lisbon’s response to it. While Vernia holds that the subject-matter of physics is mobile body, Gomes argues it is natural substance. What is at stake is how to combine experience, definition, and demonstration to obtain a consistent scientific method. Only through the study of this kind of text and discussion can we gather a solid background to elucidate what has changed and what has been inherited from the past in the scientific shift of the seventeenth century. (shrink)

Mario Savio is widely known as the first spokesman for the Free Speech Movement. Having spent the summer of 1964 as a civil rights worker in segregationist Mississippi, Savio returned to the University of California at a time when students throughout the country were beginning to mobilize in support of racial justice and against the deepening American involvement in Vietnam. His moral clairty, his eloquence, and his democratic style of leadership inspired thousands of fellow Berkeley students to protest university (...) regulations that had severely limited political speech and activity on campus. The nonviolent campaign culminated in the largest mass arrest in American history, drew widespread faculty support, and resulted in a revision of university rules to permit political speech and organizing. This significant advance for student freedom rapidly spread to countless other colleges and universities across the country. Mario Savio went on to become a college teacher of physics, logic, and philosophy, to speak and organize in favor of immigrant rights and affirmative action and against U.S. intervention in Central America. He died on November 6, 1996, in the middle of a struggle against California State University fee hikes that hurt working-class students. Savio had submitted this article to the Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic before he died. Final revisions were made by Philip Clayton with the assistance of Mario's colleagues at Sonoma State University. As reader for the Journal, George Englebretsen not only provided an extensive commentary on the article--much of which has been incorporated here--but also assisted in the difficult task of making revisions without changing the substance of Mario's style or thought. It is fitting that this, Savio's final publication, would be pedagogical in orientation. For him, moral considerations were no less pertinent in logic than in philosophy's less abstract fields. The usual student confusion with Venn diagrams led him to develop the new pictorial device presented in the following pages, which he believed was more sensitive to user psychology. It is hard to miss the political overtones in Savio's closing worry that in Venn diagrams "information of real significance may occasionally appear hidden and distorted." The decision by the Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic to publish this piece posthumously is a testimony that logic, no less than other fields of philosophy, can be a tool of free speech and political change--as powerful in its way as the rhetorical brilliance of that young man standing on top of a police car who launched a worldwide movement with the words, "There is a time when the operation of the machine becomes so odious, makes you so sick at heart, you can't take part.". (shrink)

Two concepts of truth as correspondence of ideas with facts are analyzed. One of them is the thought-external fact relation, and the other is the fact-proposition one. The two maps are then composed, and the resulting map is assumed to formalize the concept of truth as adequacy or correspondence of ideas to facts. Besides, some desiderata for a correspondence theory of partial truth are proposed. Finally, the truth criteria employed in science and technology are recalled.

The article aims at analyzing and connecting the ideas of justice and generations in a phenomenological perspective beyond the classical approaches. It suggests a shift from the concept of generations to those of generating and generativity in a phenomenological sense. The debate involves different philosophical positions about the main distinction ‘contemporaneity/not-contemporaneity’. At the end, the essay proposes a confrontation between phenomenology and philosophies of the otherness, discussing three basic ideas: temporalization, historicity and generating of generations.

The question whether the notion of rigidity can be extended in a fruitful way beyond singular terms has received a standard answer in the literature, according to which non-singular terms designate kinds, properties or other abstract singular objects and generalized rigidity is the same thing as singular term rigidity, but for terms designating such objects. I offer some new criticisms of this view and go on to defend an alternative view, on which non-singular terms designate extensions in general, and generalized (...) rigidity is identity of extension across possible worlds. I develop some fundamental positive considerations that make this view virtually inevitable as a view of generalized rigidity, emphasizing its exclusive ability to offer a purely logical justification of the necessity of several kinds of statements that go beyond true identity statements between rigid singular terms. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to analyze the association between coaches’ experience and their perceptions on the implementation of a long-term athletic development model created in 2016 by the Portuguese Swimming Federation. Eighty-six swimming coaches were assembled in groups according to their experience level: “novice”, “intermediate”, and “experienced”, and they answered a questionnaire with the following items: awareness of the existing model acceptance usefulness for practice, and implementation of this model by their peers. Regardless of experience, ~67% of the (...) coaches were aware of the model. Among those, a large number showed acceptance and confidence in its usefulness for their daily practice. Most coaches showed concerns about the fact that their peers do not respect the model frameworks, declaring the search for their swimmers’ immediate success as the main cause for such behavior. The results also showed an association between experience and knowledge about the model’s existence [χ2 = 10.223, p < 0.01, V = 0.345], and experienced coaches exhibited better knowledge than their intermediate [χ2 = 9.555, p < 0.01, V = 0.393] or novice [χ2 = 5.926, p = 0.02, V = 0.314] counterparts. While there was an association between the coaches’ experience and knowledge about the LTAD model’s existence, this situation does not seem to influence the way coaches accept and understand the usefulness of the model for their daily practice. (shrink)

Criticisms à la Laudan can block the “no miracles” argument for the (approximate) truth of whole theories. Realists have thus retrenched, arguing that at least the individual claims deployed in the derivation of novel predictions should be considered (approximately) true. But for Lyons (2002) there are historical counterexamples even to this weaker “deployment” realism: he lists a number of novel predictions supposedly derived from (radically) false claims. But if so, those successes would seem unexplainable, even by Lyons’ “modest surrealism” or (...) other surrogates to realism. In fact, I argue, some of those predictions were an easy guess, or independently probable in the light of available evidence; hence, they are no counterexamples to deployment realism, for the no miracles argument wouldn’t apply to them. In other instances, pace Lyon, the prediction was actually false, and could be reinterpreted as true only by interpreting as true also the claim from which it was derived; or again, a false claim was employed in the derivation of a true prediction, but inessentially, the essential role being played by a weaker true claim. But as soon as the paradoxical air of such historical cases is explained away in any of these manners, they cease to represent counterexamples to deployment realism. If, as I suggest, all of them can be dealt with by these strategies, a theoretical claim can still be assumed to be true if it is crucial in deriving an improbable novel prediction. (shrink)

Por ocasião do cinquentenário da morte de Freud, ocorrida em 1989, multiplicaram-se as homenagens e as publicaçães que acentuaram não só os aspectos clínicos da sua obra científica, mas também o valor e a significação cultural da Psicanálise. O mesmo haveria de ocorrer uma década mais tarde por ocasião do centenário da publicação de A Interpretação dos Sonhos, obra inaugural da técnica psicanalítica e uma das principais marcas na história da psicologia contemporânea. Com opresente artigo, o autor pretende demonstrar até (...) que ponto a Psicanálise é ainda hoje uma teoria e uma prática tão viva como conflitiva, mostrando, além disso, até que ponto ela assumiu, tal como Freud previra, um carácter de autêntica revolução científica e epistemológica, similar à copernicana ou a darwiniana nos seus respectivos momentos historicos. Neste sentido, para la de analisar diversas posturas culturais em relação à Psicanálise, as quais nos interrogam acerca da sua presumível universalidade, o artigo mostra também até que ponto a descoberta do Inconsciente constitui profundo abalo no estatuto do sujeito humano. /// At the time the fiftieth anniversary of Freud's death occurred, which happened in 1989, many celebrations and publications took place, many of which highlighting not only the clinical aspects of Freud's work, but also the cultural value and meaning of Psychoanalysis. Something similar occurred ten years later on the occasion of the centenary of the publication of the The Interpretation of Dreams, work of fundamental importance for the understanding of the psychoanalytic method and one of the main moments in the history of modern psychology With the present article, the author aims at demonstrating to what extent Psychoanalysis is still a theory and a practice as lively as it is conflictive, showing, among other things how it came to assume, as Freud himself had predicted, a character of an authentic scientific and epistemological revolution, in many ways similar to the Copernican and Darwinian revolutions in their respective historical moments. In this way, besides analysing different cultural attitudes toward Psychoanalysis, which put into question its presumed universality, the article also shows how the discovery of the Unconscious constitutes a deep shuddering in the statute of the human subject. (shrink)